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I
INTRODUCTION
When bargainers have access to different information, they may find it
impossible to reach agreements without costly impasses. Several people use
this insight to build models in which asymmetrically informed litigants fail to
settle disputes, choosing instead to pursue a costly trial in order to resolve a
conflict. This article develops a model in which incomplete information
between litigants leads to bargaining impasses; the model is then used to
compare the properties of discovery rules that govern the pretrial disclosure
of information.
In the model of this article, two potential litigants have private information
regarding an accident. Should the dispute go to trial, this information
determines the outcome. After the injured party decides to bring suit, the
defendant can make an offer to settle out of court. If the plaintiff accepts the
offer, the litigants settle. If the plaintiff rejects the offer, she may make a
counteroffer. If the defendant rejects the plaintiff's counteroffer, the litigants
go to trial. The model places no restrictions on what the litigants may offer.
Hence, a litigant may learn about an opponent's private information from the
amount of a settlement offer. The amount and probability of a settlement are
endogenously determined (that is, derived from litigant's behavior and not
predetermined). This article presents a framework in which to measure the
effect of legal rules on the outcomes of the litigation process. Specifically, by
explicitly modeling the informational asymmetries that lead to disagreements,
I am able to study the effect on the nature and frequency of settlements of
rules that require defendants to reveal private information. The analysis
demonstrates that if disclosure is costly, then the defendant will not
voluntarily disclose information; that mandatory discovery reduces the
probability of trials, benefits plaintiffs, and harms defendants; and that the
litigation process typically provides a biased sample of disputes for trial.
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LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Other work in sequential litigation models has been unable to present a
theoretical justification for selecting a single equilibrium outcome in a game
in which litigants' actions convey information. For this reason, comparative-
statics analysis' based on examining a single equilibrium could not be
convincing. I apply equilibrium-selection arguments of Banks and Sobel, and
Kohlberg and Mertens to characterize a unique outcome in a game in which
both litigants have private information and both may make settlement offers.2
While similar in structure to other game-theoretic treatments of settlement
and litigation, my model differs from the others because it allows for multiple
offers, information transmission via actions, and two-sided uncertainty in
which both the plaintiff and defendant are uncertain about the extent of the
other's negligence or injury, respectively. Bebchuk, Cave, P'ng, Reinganum
and Wilde, and Salant present settlement models in which one litigant has
private information.3  In Bebchuk's model, the defendant has private
information, but only the plaintiff can make settlement offers. Bebchuk is able
to characterize a unique equilibrium outcome. 4 However, because only the
uninformed litigant can make offers, the settlement process does not convey
information. In the models of Cave, Reinganum and Wilde, and Salant, the
informed plaintiff makes a settlement demand. These models are essentially
identical. 5 Reinganum and Wilde concentrate their analysis on one of a large
number of sequential equilibria.6 The one-stage version of the game that I
analyze, in which only the plaintiff makes settlement offers, reduces to the
model of Salant. 7 Moreover, the equilibrium that I select in the one-stage
model corresponds to that analyzed by Reinganum and Wilde. 8 My
arguments lend some theoretical support to their analysis. Cave's paper
discusses the implications of various equilibrium refinement ideas on the
outcomes in this model.9 The informed defendant may decide to make a
1. Comparative statics is a method of analysis that compares a new equilibrium position with an
old one following a disturbance to the system (e.g., changing an exogenous variable).
2. Banks & Sobel, Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games, 55 ECONOMETRICA 647 (1987);
Kohlberg & Mertens, On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria, 54 ECONOMETRmICA 1003 (1986).
3. Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. EcoN. 404, 406
(1984); P'ng, Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 BELLJ. ECON. 539 (1983); Reinganum &
Wilde, Settlement, Litigation and the Allocation of Litigation Costs, 17 RANDJ. ECON. 557, 559 (1986); Cave,
Refinements of Sequential Equilibrium in a Legal Settlements Game, (rev. ed. Mar. 1987) (Rand
Corporation working paper); Salant, Litigation of Settlement Demands Questioned by Bayesian
Defendants, Social Science Working Paper 516, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences,
California Institute of Technology (1984).
4. Bebchuck, supra note 3, at 407-08.
5. Cave, supra note 3, at 6; Reinganum & Wilde, supra note 3, at 557; Salant, supra note 3, at 4.
6. Reinganum & Wilde, supra note 3, at 560. A sequential equilibrium is a collection of
strategies (one for each player), and beliefs (describing what a player believes about his opponents
whenever it is his turn to move). A sequential equilibrium is a Nash Equilibrium, see infra note 10.
Each player's strategy must maximize his expected payoff given his beliefs and the strategies of the
other players. The beliefs about what other players do must be consistent with prior information and
equilibrium strategies, see infra note 27. See Kreps & Wilson, Sequential Equilibria, 50 ECONOMETRICA
863 (1982).
7. Salant, supra note 3, at 7.
8. Reinganum & Wilde, supra note 3.
9. Cave, supra note 3, at 2-6.
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settlement offer in P'ng's model. However, the amount of this offer is
determined exogenously. P'ng also does not distinguish between sequential
equilibria and Nash Equilibria' 0 that depend on a plaintiff's (incredible)
commitment to go to trial." Banks analyzes a model with two-sided
uncertainty and the possibility of information transmission. He restricts
attention to a subset of the sequential equilibria and analyzes the effect of
various liability rules on the outcome of the litigation process. 12 P'ng
examines the influence legal rule changes have on decisions to take care prior
to litigation.' 3 Cho and Schweizer look at the sets of equilibria that survive
various refinement arguments in models with two-sided incomplete
information.' 4 Meurer's strategic settlement model differs from the others
discussed because a settlement in Meurer's model may be an agreement that
allows two firms to share monopoly profits (a patent license agreement). 15
I know of three other game-theoretic models of the settlement process.
Ordover and Rubinstein model a game in which two parties have a fixed, finite
number of opportunities to reach an agreement. During this time, if one
party concedes, a settlement occurs at an exogenously determined value.
Otherwise, a trial ensues. One party knows the outcome that would result at a
trial, whereas the other party does not. The uninformed party can draw
inferences about his opponent's information when the opponent fails to
concede. However, there is no way to convey information through settlement
offers. 16 Cooter, Marks, Mnookin, and Samuelson analyze models in which
both sides have private information and the potential litigants make
simultaneous settlement offers. If the offers are compatible (that is, the
defendant offers to pay at least as much as the plaintiff demands), then the
litigants compromise; otherwise, they go to trial. Cooter, Marks, and
Mnookin present comparative-statics results, but they do not explicitly
10. A player's strategy describes a complete plan of action. In the model of pretrial bargaining a
strategy for the plaintiff specifies as a function of her private information, which settlements of the
defendant to accept and which to reject, and, in the event of a rejection, what counteroffer to make.
A strategy combination is a set consisting of one strategy for each player in the game.
A Nash Equilibrium is a strategy combination such that no player has an incentive to change his
or her strategy (that is, that doing so would not raise the expected payoff) as long as the other players
do not deviate from their strategies. In order to obtain predictions, I make further restrictions (or
refinements) on the Nash Equilibrium concept, see infra note 23.
11. P'ng, supra note 3.
12. Banks, Negligence, Liability, and the Settlement of Disputes (1986) (doctoral dissertation,
California Institute of Technology).
13. P'ng, Liability, Litigation, and Incentives for Care, 34 J. PuB. ECON. 61 (1987).
14. I. Cho, Pre-Trial Negotiation Under Asymmetric Negotiation, in Refinement of Sequential
Equilibrium: Theory and Application (1986) (doctoral dissertation, Princeton University); see also
Schweizer, Litigation and Settlement under Two-sided Incomplete Information, 56 REV. ECON. STUD. 163
(1989).
15. Meurer, The Settlement of Patent Litigation, 20 RANDJ. ECON. 77 (1989).
16. Ordover & Rubinstein, A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Information, 101 QJ. EcON.
879 (1986).
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describe their equilibria, and the nature of the informational asymmetries in
their model is unclear.17
Spulber characterizes the incentive-efficient mechanisms 18 for a class of
settlement problems. This approach promises to provide a description of
outcomes that is independent of a particular extensive-form description of the
settlement game. Spulber's comparative-statics results describe the changes
in the set of incentive-efficient outcomes.19
Gould studies a model that predicts which disputes will be settled prior to
going to court. Settlements are not possible in this case if litigants have
different estimates about whether they will prevail at a trial. Gould does not
explain how these differences of opinion arise.20 Posner also discusses factors
that encourage settlement prior to a trial. He identifies a simple cost-benefit
tradeoff that determines when disputes will go to court. 21 Shavell models the
decision to bring a suit as a decision problem faced by the plaintiff alone. He
studies how the rule that governs the allocation of costs in the event of a trial
influences the pattern of settlements.2 2 All three of these models ignore the
possibility that one litigant's behavior may influence the other's subjective
assessment of the outcome in the event of a trial. Game-theoretic models
focus precisely on this strategic aspect of the pretrial bargaining process.
I wish to emphasize three aspects of this article. The first aspect is
methodological. It is possible to provide a general solution concept 23 that
selects a unique outcome for a strategic model of pretrial bargaining. These
techniques make it possible to analyze a broad set of models related to law
and economics. However, the construction of equilibria and proofs of
uniqueness are routine technical exercises; the Appendix contains an outline
of these arguments.
Second, it is important to emphasize that most of the qualitative results of
this article depend strongly on the model itself and the solution concept I use.
While the uniqueness results that I obtain are not special to the particular
game that I describe, the characteristics of the outcome are. The legal
bargaining process is a complicated one. In order to develop tractable
17. Cooter, Marks & Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic
Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 230 (1982). Samuelson, Negotiation vs. Litigation, Boston
University School of Management Working Paper (rev. ed. 1983).
18. Incentive-efficient mechanisms are mechanisms that lead to efficient outcomes (the best
allocation of resources), given the constraints imposed on information or actions.
19. Spulber, Negligence, Contributory Negligence and Pre-Trial Settlement Negotiation,
Modeling Research Group Working Paper No. M85 11, Department of Economics, University of
California, San Diego (1985).
20. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 284 (1973).
21. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUn.
399, 418 (1973).
22. Shavell, Suit and Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the
Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1988).
23. A solution concept is simply an equilibrium concept like the sequential equilibrium, supra
note 6, or the Nash Equilibrium, supra note 10. By a general solution concept, I mean a solution
concept that applies to a broad class of games rather than to a particular example. In this article, I
use the D I refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept developed by Cho and Kreps. See infra
note 30.
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models, one must omit certain details and concentrate on others. I do not
apologize for neglecting the impact of litigation on third parties (either
through reputation effects or because the discovery process reveals valuable
information to third parties); the bargaining process is rich and interesting
enough without including this feature. However, many conclusions obtained
from my model (and other game-theoretic models of the settlement process)
depend on idealized details of the bargaining process. For example, the
number of rounds of bargaining prior to trial and, especially, the party who
has the last word, dramatically influence the impact of rules that govern
allocation of court costs. This type of sensitivity results from a genuine
indeterminacy in the bargaining process. In order to be confident about the
predictions from game models, one must include more institutional detail.
The analysis of this paper only demonstrates the range of possible qualitative
results.
Third, some conclusions from the strategic model of settlement and
litigation appear to be general. Pretrial settlements occur because
disagreement is costly. If there were no costs associated with trial, one would
not expect serious pretrial bargaining. One cannot depend upon voluntary
disclosure to reveal all relevant information prior to trial. The rules
governing discovery and pretrial bargaining influence the type of dispute that
goes to trial. However, one cannot make general statements about the nature
of all disputes from the nature of disputes that actually lead to trial.
II
THE MODEL
This section describes the basic model.
Players. There are two players (litigants): a plaintiff (P) and a defendant (d).
Note that throughout this article, upper-case variables refer to the plaintiff
and lower-case variables refer to the defendant.
Information. Both the plaintiff and the defendant begin the game with private
information that reflects the quality of their case. P's information could
reflect the amount of damage P suffered; d's information could reflect his own
degree of negligence. The information is private: Neither player's
information is known to the other player. I assume that a litigant's
information can take on one of two possible values, low (L or 1) or high (H or
h). I call a plaintiff who has (observes) private information i, a plaintiff of type
i or P-i, where i=L for a low injury or H for a serious injury. Similarly, d-j
is a defendant who has (observes) private informationj, wherej=l for a weak
case (high negligence) or h for a strong case (low negligence). The
probability before any action has taken place (prior probability), that d is type
j is qj; the prior probability that P is type i is Q. So, for example, the prior
probability that d is type 1 might be q, = 50 percent. This belief, of course,
may change once bargaining has begun, since information about types is
conveyed through actions; such a revised belief would be called a posterior
belief. I assume that one litigant's type has no effect in determining the other
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litigant's type: that is, that qj does not depend on P's type i and that Q does
not depend on d's typej. This independence assumption is not restrictive;
that is, such a dependence could be included in this model without changing
any results.
Litigation Process. The litigation process takes place in stages. First, the
plaintiff decides to sue. Second, the defendant makes a settlement offer to the
plaintiff. If the plaintiff accepts the offer, the litigation process stops, and the
defendant pays the plaintiff the amount of the offer. If the plaintiff rejects the
offer, negotiation continues. What happens next depends on the nature of
the discovery process. I explicitly consider two discovery rules. Under
mandatory disclosure, the defendant must reveal his private information if P
rejects his first offer. Misrepresentation is not possible. Therefore, after d
reveals j, P knows d's type. I assume that the cost of disclosure is c > 0,
regardless of d's type. When the other discovery rule holds, d does not
disclose j. I informally discuss a third possibility, voluntary disclosure, and
argue that the two polar cases capture the properties of a voluntary-disclosure
model. After the discovery phase, P makes a settlement demand. If d accepts
this demand, the litigation process stops, and the defendant pays the plaintiff
the amount P demanded. If d rejects the demand, the dispute goes to trial. At
a trial, P and d receive payoffs that depend on their private information.
Implicitly I assume that the judge and jury learn about the private information
of the litigants during trial and form their verdict accordingly.
Payoffs. Litigants are risk-neutral (that is, they would not require a higher
expected return as compensation for an increase in risk). If they fail to settle
their dispute out of court, the court determines the payoffs. When P observes
i, and d observesj (where again i andj can take on high or low values), T(i,j)
denotes what P expects to receive (expected payoff), net of court costs, if the
case goes to trial, and t (i,j) denotes the amount that d expects to pay
(including court costs). I assume that
(1) T(L,h) < T(L,1),
(2) T(Hh) < T(HI)
(3) t(L,h) < t(L,1), and
(4) t(Hh) < t(H,).
The first inequality states that P's expected payoff when her damages are low
and the defendant's case is strong will be less than her expected payoff when
her damages are high and the defendant's case is weak. The other inequalities
can be described in a similar fashion.
Because P will get a larger payoff at the trial if i=H, she prefers that i=H
rather than i=L, independent ofj; likewise P prefers thatj=1 rather thanj=h
independent of i. The defendant's preferences go in the opposite direction
(recall that t (i,j) is d-j's payment given that P is type i). I also assume that
0 < T(i,j) < t(i,j).
The first inequality (0 < T(i,j)) states that P always has something to gain by
going to trial. In Part IV, I discuss what happens when this condition fails to
hold. The second inequality (T(i,j) < t (i,j)) implies that when there is a trial,
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the defendant pays more than the amount P receives. This assumption cap-
tures the idea of court costs. The total amount of these costs is t(i,j)-T(i,j).
While it would be easy to present a specification that describes how these
costs are allocated, I argue later that the game that I analyze is too special to
give meaningful answers to questions about the effect of rules governing the
allocation of court costs. The only costs in the negotiation process are disclo-
sure costs and court costs. 24
Strategies. The strategies25 for P consist of probabilities Ri(s) and demands Si.
The probability that P-i accepts d's settlement offer of s is R,(s). S, is P-i's
settlement demand given that she has not accepted d's first offer. The first
offer of d, (s), and subsequent disclosure of his private information (if
required) typically conveyed information to P. Therefore, Si depends on s and
d's disclosure (if any). The strategies for d consist of probabilities rj(S) and
offers,. The definition of r(S) is the probability that d-j accepts a settlement
demand S given that P rejects d's offer. The definition of sj is d-j's settlement
offer. To give an example, if i=L andj=h, then d-h would offer sh, which P
would accept with a probability of Ri(sh). Ifsh was rejected, P-L would make a
settlement demand of SL, which d-h would accept with a probability of
rh(SL) .26
Beliefs. In order to describe equilibria, I need to specify how litigants inter-
pret offers that they do not expect to receive in equilibrium. The beliefs of d
are probability distributions for each S and s, ([t(LIS,s), [t(HIS,s)), where
[(iS,s) is the probability that d believes P is type i given the demand S and
offer s. Similarly, v(jls) is the probability that P assigns to the event that d is
typej following an offer s. Beliefs are held by each player about the other
player's type. These beliefs evolve during the course of bargaining, as more
information is made available, via the actions of the other player. For
example, d-l might initially believe that P is type H with a probability of 50
percent (QH=50 percent). After d makes an offer of s and (if s is rejected)
receives a settlement demand of S (both the rejection and the counterdemand
24. Total court costs given i andj are equal to t (i,j)-T(ij). Therefore, I can evaluate a rule
that allocates court costs as a function of i and j by looking at how equilibria vary when t and T
change but t- T remains constant. I can also derive the values t and T by assuming that i andjjointly
determine the probability that the plaintiff wins a trial. Specifically, if p(ij) is the probability that P
wins given i andj, M is the amount that P wins, and P's (d's) court costs are B,(bi), then
t(i,j)=p(i,j)M+b0 and
T(i, j ) =p (i, j )M- B,
Varying the b, and B, allows me to describe all of the standard methods of allocating court costs.
25. See supra note 10.
26. It is also possible to allow litigants to use probabilistic settlement offers. Such a mixed
strategy would involve a player making more than one offer with positive probability. If the
defendant made a probabilistic settlement offer, then his mixed strategy would specify the
probability that his counteroffer is s for any value of s. For example, the defendant may decide to be
aggressive one-half of the time and only offer to pay the plaintiff a token amount to avoid a trial,
while the rest of the time making a more generous settlement offer. This type of mixed strategy does
not arise in the equilibria that I characterize. The reason for this is that the defendant will always find
a single offer to be superior than all others: When it is a good strategy to be aggressive, it will
necessarily be a poor strategy to be conciliatory. Therefore there is no loss of generality in ignoring
the possibility of using these general strategies in the description of the game.
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convey information about P), he might then believe that P is type H with a
probability of 40 percent. The important point here is that beliefs allow a
player to interpret and respond in an intelligent way even to unexpected
offers or demands.
Equilibrium. An equilibrium consists of strategies and beliefs (Ri(s), Si, r (S),
sj; R (i S, s), v (Is)) for i, j = 0,1 such that, given the strategies of the other
player and beliefs, a player's strategy choice maximizes his or her expected
payoff. I require in the model that a player's beliefs satisfy additional require-
ments. The beliefs must support a sequential equilibrium. 27 The notion of
sequential equilibria, due to Kreps and Wilson, captures the idea that players
should respond optimally to some consistent assessment of how the game has
been played. In other words, each player observes the other player's actions
and can infer the probability of an event (or type). He or she will then
respond in a way that maximizes his or her expected payoff.28
The concept of sequential equilibrium does not place sufficient restrictions
on the way in which unexpected offers and demands are interpreted. Recent
theoretical papers by Banks and Sobel, 29 Cho and Kreps,30 and Cho and
Sobel 3' have exploited ideas of Kohlberg and Mertens3 2 to refine the sequen-
tial equilibrium concept. The refinement ideas use the notion of equilibrium
dominance. 33 Imagine that the litigants are familiar with the way that settle-
ment games have been played in the past. Imagine that both plaintiff and
defendant know clearly what to expect if they use their information in the
"expected" way (that is, they follow equilibrium strategies). How should they
decide whether to make an "unexpected" offer? One approach is to compute
the expected gain from making an unexpected offer and to compare this gain
to the equilibrium utility.
The refinement notion, or restriction, that this article employs assumes
that unexpected offers come from the type of agent more likely to gain from
making them. Concretely, if both types of plaintiff are expected to make the
same settlement demand in equilibrium, then I require that a higher (out-of-
equilibrium) demand be interpreted as coming from the more injured plaintiff
27. Beliefs support a sequential equilibrium if they are consistent with prior distributions and
equilibrium strategies. In this model, Bayes' Rule determines vy(j ) whenever the equilibrium
specifies that d makes the offer s with positive probability and Bayes' Rule determines IL (iS,s)
whenever the equilibrium specifies that d makes the offers and, with positive probability, P responds
to this offer with the demand S. Bayes' Rule is the method by which new information (the result of an
experiment or, in this model, a settlement offer) is combined with a given distribution (the prior) to
form a new distribution (the posterior). See I FELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY THEORY AND
ITS APPLICATIONS 124 (3d ed. 1968).
28. Kreps & Wilson, supra note 6.
29. Banks & Sobel, supra note 2.
30. Cho & Kreps, Signaling Games and Stable Equilibia, 102 Q.J. ECON. 179 (1987).
31. Cho & Sobel, Strategic Stability and Uniqueness in Signaling Games, Discussion Paper No.
87-10, Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego (1987).
32. Kohlberg & Mertens, supra note 2.
33. Equilibrium dominance is an argument used to eliminate equilibria that involve implausible
behavior. When equilibrium dominance arguments are applied, beliefs are not allowed to place
positive probability on the possibility that a player would use a strategy that leads to a payoff strictly
less than an equilibrium payoff.
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with a probability of 100 percent. This result follows because the more
injured plaintiff has more to lose from increasing the demand than the less
injured plaintiff, because the less injured plaintiff gains more in court when
there is no settlement. Cho and Kreps call this restriction the D1 criterion. 34
I define the restriction formally in the Appendix. To follow the article, one
need only note that the restriction requires that players interpret demands
higher (lower) than the equilibrium specifies for the more injured plaintiff as
signs that the plaintiff is more (less) injured, and offers higher (lower) than the
equilibrium specifies for the strong defendant as signs that the defendant has
a strong (weak) case. Notice that these inferences necessarily are drawn for
offers and demands actually specified by equilibrium strategies. That is, in
any Nash Equilibrium to the game, the less injured type of plaintiff never
demands more than the more injured type of plaintiff. It is important to
emphasize that restricting beliefs reduces the size of the equilibrium set by
limiting the range of off-the-equilibrium-path behavior. The restrictions
derived from DI are strong, but they are plausible, and they are consistent
with existence of equilibrium in general games. This type of restriction is nec-
essary if one wishes to obtain a unique equilibrium prediction for the game
analyzed in this article. Below, I refer to the unique equilibrium, under the
more restrictive DI criterion, as the unique DI outcome.3 5
III
THE ONE-STAGE MODEL
This Part describes the equilibrium behavior in a settlement model in
which only one round of bargaining can take place before trial. I assume that
the plaintiff makes a single demand S, which the defendant either accepts or
rejects. If the defendant accepts the demand, then d pays S to P. If the
defendant rejects the demand, then the suit goes to trial. The expected
judgment depends directly on the litigants' private information; given i andj,
T(, j) is the expected payment (net of court costs) to P and t (i, j) is d's
expected payment.
I compute the equilibrium outcome of this game under two informational
assumptions. First, I assume that P knows d's type (that is, the value ofj).
This corresponds to the case in which there are liberal discovery rules that
require d to disclose private information. Next, I analyze the game that results
if disclosure is not mandatory.
A. Plaintiff Knows d's Type
First, I describe a particular sequential equilibrium. Next, I demonstrate
that this is the unique Dl outcome.
34. Cho & Kreps, supra note 30, at 204.
35. I call an equilibrium unique if all equilibrium strategies agree along the equilibrium path.
Strategies and beliefs may differ off the equilibrium path.
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To construct the equilibrium, first identify the demand that P-L would
make if his type were known to d. This demand must be t (L,j) since this is
what a type j defendant would pay if the case goes to trial. Therefore, it is a
dominant strategy3 6 for d-j to accept any demand S < t (L,j). Further, if d-j
believes the demand S > t(L, j) comes from P-L, then he rejects the
demand. Thus, P-L demands t(L,j) which would be her demand in a one-
period, complete information game with d-j.
I construct the equilibrium offer of P-H,SH(j), and d's response to it, to
satisfy
(a) d-j infers that i=H given SH(j),
(b) P-L is indifferent between demanding t (L, j) and SH(j), and
(c) P-H prefers to demand SI(j)
to t(L,j).
The first thing we can infer from conditions (a)-(c) is that SH(j) > t (L,j).
Since P-H has a stronger case than P-L, it makes sense that P-H's settle-
ment demand will be higher than what P-L can get should the case go to
trial. Second, d-j must reject the settlement demand SH(j) with a positive
probability (otherwise P-L would always demand SH(j)). d-j must accept
SH(j) with some positive probability, since in (b) P-L is indifferent between
demanding t(L,j) and S(j), but if SH(j) were always rejected, then making
this demand would yield P-L T(L,j) < t (L,j). Third, we know that
SH(j)=t(Hj) because t(Hj) is the unique demand that makes d-j indif-
ferent between accepting or rejecting a demand given that i=H; d-j would
always reject SH(j) > t (H,j) since this is more than he would have to pay in a
trial. Likewise, P-H would not demand less than t (H,j) since she knows d-j
will have to pay this amount if the case goes to trial.
Assume now that r * equals the probability that d-j accepts t (H, j) (and
1 -r* is the probability of rejection). Then P-L's expected utility3 7 from
t (Hj) is r*t (Hj) + (1 -r*)T(L,j) since P-L only gets T(Lj) if d-j rejects
his demand of SH(j)=t (H,j). Recall from condition (b) that P-L is indif-
ferent between demanding t (L,j) and S,(j). Then it must be the case that
r*t(H,j) + (l-r*)T(L,j)=t(L,j).
We can rewrite this to solve for r*, the probability of acceptance:
(1) r* = [t(L,j)-T(L,j)]/I[t(H,j)-T(L,j)]
For r* defined in (1), we see that P-H strictly prefers to make the demand
t (H, j) than to make the demand t (L, j).
We have now described how d and P make their choices, based on the
information revealing actions and expected demands of the other litigant. To
36. A dominant strategy is a strategy that maximizes a player's payoff given the strategies of the
other players, no matter what the other players choose to do. Notice that the player's payoff might
depend on the actions that other players take, but he or she will always obtain the highest possible
payoff by playing a dominant strategy.
37. Utility is a numerical measure of an individual's preferences. An individual maximizes his
utility by finding his most preferred bundle of goods, given his budget constraint. In the case
described in this article, the plaintiff derives utility from money payoffs, since such payoffs increase
her ability to purchase goods. The defendant's payments lower his utility.
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complete the description of the equilibrium, I must specify d's beliefs and
responses for unexpected demands. For demands strictly between I (L,j) and
t (H,j), the equilibrium concept that I employ requires that d-j believe that
i=L with probability of 100 percent. Therefore, d-j rejects these demands
with probability of 100 percent. Independent of his beliefs, d-j always rejects
demands greater than t (H,J) and always accepts demands less than t (L,j).
Any specification of beliefs given these demands supports an equilibrium.
Thus far, I have shown only that the strategies described above meet the
requirements of a sequential equilibrium. In the appendix, I confirm that
these strategies are indeed the only strategies that survive DI. A few remarks
about the outcome are in order.
Remark 1. The equilibrium corresponds to the Pareto-dominating separating
equilibrium that is often prominent in analyses of signaling models. 38 In this
kind of equilibrium, different types of a player use different strategies, thereby
revealing their information. The "lowest" type (here P-L) does exactly as
well as it would in a game with complete information. All higher types do less
well, since they get their offer of S1,(j) rejected with a positive probability, and
thus cannot capture the full amount of court costs (that is, expected payoff will
be less than t(H,j)).
Remark 2. The arguments I use to describe the equilibrium in which P has
exactly two types generalize to models in which i can take on more than two
values provided that t (i,j) and T(i,j) strictly increase when i increases andj is
fixedj. When there is a continuum of types, this equilibrium corresponds to
the separating equilibrium that Reinganum and Wilde analyze. 39
Remark 3. The equilibrium requires that d-j play a weakly dominated
strategy40 in response to the demand t(H,j): d-j is indifferent between
accepting and rejecting t(H,j) when i=H; however, when i=L, he strictly
prefers to reject t(H,j). Many equilibrium refinement notions require that
players do not use weakly dominated strategies in equilibrium. These notions
apply to games in which the strategy spaces of the players are finite. When a
player, such as P, can make a continuum of possible demands, a weakly domi-
nated strategy is used. If I required that P could only make demands that
belong to a discrete set, 1, the qualitative nature of the equilibrium would
change little, but P would no longer choose a weakly dominated strategy.
Provided that 1 has enough strategies to allow a separating equilibrium to
exist, the unique DI-equilibrium outcome would have
SL(j) = max fS: SEI, S < t (L,j)I
and
SH(j) = max {S: SEX, S < t (H,j)
38. See Cho & Sobel, supra note 31, at 21.
39. Reinganum & Wilde, supra note 3.
40. See infra Table 1. The strategy that leads to acceptance of P's settlement demand (without
knowing the value of i) is weakly dominated by a strategy that leads to rejection, since the payoff
(with either strategy) is as good (-S) when i=H, but worse when i=L (-S > -t(L,j)).
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P-L would be indifferent between the demands SL(j) and SH(j) and would
randomize between these two demands in order to make d-j indifferent
between accepting and rejecting SH(j). P-H would strictly prefer the
demand S,1(j) to SL(j). d-j would accept SL(j) with a probability of 100 per-
cent and reject SH(j) with exactly the probability needed to make P-L indif-
ferent between demanding SL(j) and SH(j). It is a simple matter to check that
if I (H, j) S11(j) approaches zero, the probability that P-L demands SH(j) goes
to zero as well. The equilibrium that I have constructed is a limit of equilibria
to discrete games.
Observe that very simple games with continuous strategy spaces require
players to use dominated strategies. For example, if two players bid for $1,
with the dollar going to the higher bidder at his bid and the lower bidder
paying nothing (if the two bids are equal, then each player has a 50 percent
probability of receiving the dollar and paying his bid), then the unique Nash
Equilibrium requires that both players bid $1 even though that strategy is
weakly dominated.
Remark 4. The use of weakly dominated strategies in the equilibrium to the
litigation game provides a clue to the difference between my model and the
standard labor-market signaling model.4 1 In the labor-market signaling
model, weakly dominated strategies are not used in equilibrium even when
workers have available a continuum of signals (education levels). However, in
standard signaling models it is always possible for a worker to invest so much
in education that it never pays a lower-ability worker to imitate. In the litiga-
tion model, if P-H's demand is always accepted, then P-L will want to imi-
tate this demand. To separate the two types of plaintiffs the higher demand
must be rejected with positive probability. To make this point a bit more gen-
erally, in the labor-market signaling model, workers must pay the cost of sig-
naling whatever the response to the signal, whereas in my model, the plaintiff
pays the cost of making a higher demand only if d sometimes rejects that
demand.
B. Plaintiff Does Not Know d's Type
If d does not disclose the value ofj, then P acts as if q. is the probability that
the defendant's type is j. The analysis corresponds to the case in which
discovery is impossible. There is an intermediate case in which d may
voluntarily disclose his information. I point out below that if disclosure is
costly, then it is an equilibrium for d never to reveal his type to P. Therefore,
this analysis pertains to the voluntary disclosure case.
Except for rare parameter values, there is a unique DI outcome. The
equilibrium is qualitatively similar to the equilibrium in the full disclosure
model discussed above. The plaintiff makes fully revealing offers in which
41. Signaling is a way for a player to communicate his type when players are heterogeneous and
asymmetrically informed. For example, in the standard labor-market signaling model, it is assumed
that higher levels of education do not increase a worker's ability, but are less expensive to attain for
higher ability workers. Therefore, employers may use educational levels to signal underlying ability.
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P-L does exactly what she would do if d knew that i=L, and P-H makes a
demand that leaves one type of d indifferent between accepting the demand
and going to trial given that i=H. The analysis is a bit more tedious than the
earlier case because, depending on parameter values (that is, qj), P-i makes
demands that only d-1 accepts (strong demands) or that both d-1 and d-h
accept (weak demands). However, the analysis of these cases is
straightforward.
Table 1 shows the equilibrium strategies and payoffs for the games
discussed in this section when t (L,l) =t,t (H, 1) =t+G, T(L,h) =t-G, t (H,h) =t,
and t (i,j)-T(i,j)=K. This is a representative special case in which the cost
of trial is K and the value of "good" information is Q. For example, the
difference in payoffs between t (H,h) and t (L,h) is t - (t - G) = G. While these
assumptions are special, making them destroys no essential qualitative feature
of equilibrium.
There are four different types of equilibrium. In Case A, q1, the probabilty
that the defendant is type 1, is very high. P-L makes a strong demand, which
is accepted by d-1 but not by d-h. This case arises when P-L prefers to risk
a positive probability of a trial rather than make a demand acceptable to both
types of defendant. Intuitively, this is a good strategy, since the probability
that the defendant is type 1 is high. In Case A, P-H always prefers to make a
strong demand, t+G. This result holds whenever P-L is indifferent between
demanding SL and Sly. When P-L is indifferent between P-H's demand and
his own, P-H's equilibrium expected utility can be written
U (L) + (1 -r)G
where U(L) is P-L's equilibrium expected utility and r is the probability that d
accepts the strong demand that P-H makes in equilibrium. That is, the
equilibrium utilities of P-H and P-L differ by G=T(Hj)-T(L,j) times the
probability that d rejects P-H's offer. Consequently, P-H makes strong
demands in these situations in order to maximize the difference in utility
between her and P-L. If the defendant was certain to reject a strong demand
in equilibrium (that is, r is close to zero, the difference between P-H's and
P-L's expected utility would be close to G). 4 2
42. An example in Case A: Case A, with q. >K/k+g indicates the highest probability (relative to
the three other Cases B through D) that d is type d-0. Take the situation where i=L. Although P
does not know d's type, it stands to reason that P-L would make a strong demand, t, since qt is low.
The defendant with a weak case, d-0, will accept this offer with 100% probability, since he cannot
do any better (or worse) by going to trial. The d-h-type defendant can do better than t by going to
trial (d-h only pays t-G in a trial) and thus accepts this demand with zero probability.
If j= 1, then expected utility (payoffs) for P-L and d-1 are calculated as follows. We know that
d--I accepts demand t with 100% probability. Recall, however, that P-L is indifferent between
demanding a lower amount S,(=t) and copying P-IH's high demand amount (under Case A) of
S,,(=t+G). To show this, note that d-1 accepts S11 with probability r; from Table I we can see that
r=K/(K+G). If d-I rejects this offer (which he does with probability I -r), then P-L only gets
t-K, since the case then goes to trial and court costs (K) are deducted from the payoff
(t-K=T(L,I)). Thus, P-L's expected utility is K/(K+G)(t+G) +[G/(K+G)](t-k), which is what
he would have gotten by initially demanding S,= (t).
Let us briefly look at another Case A example. We know from above that d-h always rejects
demand t. She will also reject S11 with certainty. The case will go to trial; d-h will pay -(t-G), the
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In Cases B through D, the probability that the defendant is type I drops, in
order, with q, being lowest in Case D. In each of these of equilibrium cases,
P-L makes a weak demand, t-G, and d always accepts it. In Cases B and C,
P-H makes a strong demand, t+G. In Case B, d-1 must reject P-H's
demand with positive probability, and P-L is indifferent between demanding
SL and demanding SH. In Case C, d-1 always accepts P-H's demand; P-L
strictly prefers S1. to SH. Finally, in Case D, both types of plaintiff make weak
demands. P-H's demand is sometimes rejected by d-h. This discourages
P-L from imitating P-H.
For fixed KG, and t, q, determines which type of equilibrium exists. The
equilibrium is unique provided qi#K/(G+K), and qr$I[K/(K + 2G)] 2. If
ql#[K/(K + 2G)] 2 , then P-L is indifferent between making a weak or a
strong demand. Both the Case A and Case B (or a mixture) exist in this case.
If ql]K/(G+K)2, then P-H is indifferent between making a weak or a strong
demand. Both the Case C and Case D equilibria exist in this event.
The information in Table 1 can be used to evaluate the effects of
mandatory discovery. The first thing to notice is that d-h never gains from
disclosure. For example, when i=L andj=h, d-h's expected utility is -t+G
in each of the four cases A through D. Under mandatory disclosure, d-h's
expected utility is again -t+G and thus has done no better. Therefore, the
no disclosure outcome is an equilibrium for the game in which disclosure is
voluntary. Although d-I may do better in a no disclosure equilibrium than in
the mandatory disclosure equilibrium, d-1 benefits because P believes that
j=h is possible. d-1 would not voluntarily choose to reveal that his
information is bad. Notice that even if P is skeptical in the sense that she
believes j=1 unless d makes a disclosure, it does not pay for d-h to make a
costly disclosure. This result follows because, regardless of the parameter
values, d-h does exactly as well as he expects to do should the dispute go to
trial. Therefore, for the one-stage model, d will not revealj unless disclosure
is mandatory.
The next observation to make about Table 1 is that mandatory disclosure
does not increase the ex ante probability of going to trial. This observation
follows from simple algebra. Disclosure strictly reduces the probability of
impasses in all but Case D. Providing P with more information before she
makes her demand leads to a higher probability of settlement. When P does
not know j, there is an incentive for her to make strong demands hoping that
j=1; when P knows j, P-L settles all disputes. I defer a more complete
discussion of the properties of equilibria until the end of Part V.
amount of the court award, and P-L will receive t-G-K. Thus, P-L cannot capture court costs
here.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES
(ONE-STAGE MODEL)
MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
R's probability
(,j) P's demand of acceptance
(L,I) t 1
(L,h) i-G I
K
(HI) t-+ K+
K
(H,h) GK+GC
NO DISCLOSURE
R's probability
(,j) P's demand of acceptance
CASE A (LI) 1 1
(L,h) t 0
K K
K+G (+0 K+G
(H,h) t+a 0
CASE B
Kq, K+2G
K
q, K+C
t+G
K-qG
q,(K+G)
(H,h)
CASE C (LI) t-G I
K (LAh) t-C
q1 > (H, I) t+G I
K+2C1 (Hh) t+G 0
K
K+2G
CASE D (L,) i-G 1
[ K- (,) t-1
q1( I ) t I
K+2 (Hh) t 1-G
qh(K+G)
Ex Ante Probability of Trial
Mandatory Disclosure
CASE A
CASE B
CASE C
CASE D
Expected Utility
P d
t -t
-G
G02
1+ -t-G
GKI- -l
K+G
Expected Utility
P d
t -t
t-G-K -t+G
G 2
1+ -+G-t-G
K+G
t-K -t
t-G -- +G
t-G -t-IG
qhK2 +qlG 2 -qIKG
q(K+G)
t-K -t
t-G -t-IG
t-G -t+-G
-/-G -1-G
t-K -
t-G -- +G
t-G -t+G
t -t
G -t
-G qh (K+G )
Q,,G
K+G
qh+qQIC
K+G
2qC- qhK
qhQ,,+QII K+G
qhQJI1
Q,1G
K+G
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IV
A ONE-STAGE MODEL WITH UNINJURED PLAINTIFFS
In this Part, I discuss the discovery model of Part III. Here I assume that
T(L,j) < 0; that is, P-L does not expect to win enough to make going to trial
profitable. Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that if d
rejects P's final offer, then P drops the suit. Assume that the payoff to both P
and d to a dropped suit is zero. Therefore, the payoffs to the players if P
demands S are:
d
P Accept Reject
i=L S,-S 0,0
i=H S,-S T(H,j),-t(H,j)
This model reduces to the model of the previous section, with
T (L, j) = t (L, j) = 0, since the weak case (P- L) does not go to trial. The anal-
ysis of the previous section characterizes the unique D 1-equilibrium outcome.
In this equilibrium, P-H always demands t(H,j) and d rejects any non-nega-
tive demand. 4 3 Equilibrium has these properties because if d knows that i=L,
then P-L can never obtain a positive settlement in a separating equilib-
rium, 44 whereas if d accepts a demand S > 0 with positive probability, P-L
can earn a positive expected payoff by demanding S and then dropping the
suit if d rejects S. This conclusion does not depend on the magnitude of the
court costs ( (Hj) - T(Hj), nor on the prior probability that d places on i=L
(provided that QL>0). Moreover, there exists a pooling equilibrium (in which
all P's will make the same settlement demand) that seems to be very plausible
when QL is small. If P is most often a P-H type, d will make payments to the
few P-L's that litigate to avoid the danger of turning down P-H's offer and
paying still more at trial. P-H accepts the lower sure payoff, QHt (H,j), since
it is as good or better than what she can get in court, that is, T(H,j) ::5
QHt(H,j). So P-i demands QH t(H,j) for i=L and H, and d accepts this
demand. Of course, to support this equilibrium, d must reject with positive
probability any demand S > QHt (H,j). Therefore, he must believe that P-L
is at least as likely as P-H to make a larger than expected demand. Ruling
out beliefs of this kind leads to the outcome in which P and d never settle.
43. Nalebuff considers a model in which the defendant is fully informed, but the plaintiff lacks
information about the defendant's liability and the probability that the defendant will be found liable
in the event of a trial. He finds that a positive probability of a frivolous suit limits the possibility of
pretrial settlements in equilibrium. Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial Negotiation, 18 RAND J. ECON. 198
(1987).
44. If all types of players pick the same strategy in all states, then the equilibrium is a pooling
equilibrium. It is a separating equilibrium if different types make different demands. An example of
a pooling equilibrium is one in which all litigants make the same settlement demand which is then
accepted. An example of a separating equilibrium is one in which P-H and P-L demand different
amounts.
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Several comments about this example are in order. First, the fact that the
outcome does not depend on court costs is a result of the rules of the settle-
ment game (that is, that P makes the final demand), not the solution concept.
Since P makes the final demand, d effectively must pay court costs whether or
not he accepts the demand; P's demand will capture court costs since P knows
d will have to pay these costs if the case goes to trial. Hence, the magnitude of
these costs should not affect settlement probabilities. Second, the fact that
the D I outcome depends on the support of the prior on P's information (qi),
but not on the values of QL and QH, is characteristic of all separating equilibria
in signaling models. Nevertheless, this property leads to a discontinuity: The
limit of D I outcomes as QL -* 0 (that is, as QL approaches zero) is not an equi-
librium of the complete information settlement game. (As QL - 0, the pooling
equilibrium described above does converge to the equilibrium of the com-
plete information game.) This fact is disturbing from a theoretical perspec-
tive. However, the discovery process exists in a world of incomplete
information. Thus, we can comfortably proceed with our discussion while
keeping this problem in mind.
If you accept the refinement concept (DI) and its prediction for this
model, there are still good reasons why you might expect different outcomes
in situations in which P-L does not expect to win if the suit goes to trial. In
particular, there is a situation in which P-L can benefit by committing herself
to taking the disagreement to court. If d knows that P will not drop the suit,
then it is in d's best interest to accept certain demands. Even an uninjured
plaintiff is able to extract settlements from d if the defendant's court costs
exceed those of P.
In this section, a plaintiff who does not plan to continue her suit to trial
cannot gain by filing a lawsuit. Thus, frivolous suits are not possible in this
model. This result changes if P is able to force d into making costly disclo-
sures should he fail to settle out of court.
I add this section to emphasize that the predictions of this model are very
sensitive to the equilibrium concept and that the equilibrium concept leads to
predictions that are counterintuitive.
V
THE Two-STAGE MODEL
This section treats the case in which both litigants are able to make
settlement offers. The defendant makes the first offer. If P rejects this offer,
then she has the opportunity to make a demand prior to trial. I consider two
possible rules governing disclosure of information: Either d must disclose, at
cost c, if P rejects his settlement offer; or d does not disclose his information.
He cannot misrepresent the material he discloses; after disclosure, P knows
d's type.
The analysis of this Part parallels that of Part III. There is a cost to
settlement only if there is a trial or if d discloses; otherwise P receives exactly
what d pays. Consequently, when discovery is not mandatory, there is no
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reason for d to make a serious offer. The two-period model reduces to the
one-period model with no disclosure. When discovery is mandatory, d makes
acceptable settlement offers with positive probability. The two-period
mandatory discovery game is very similar to the one-period, no-discovery
model discussed in Part III. In both of these games the litigant who moves
first is uncertain about the opponent's type and pays a cost if the first offer is
rejected. In the one-period, no-discovery model, P moves first and must pay
court costs if d rejects her demand. However, the expected payoffs given a
trial are known. In the two-stage, mandatory disclosure model, d moves first
and must pay c if P rejects his demand. However, if P does reject d's demand,
then the continuation of play reduces to a game studied in Part III.
A. Mandatory Disclosure
Table 2 summarizes the behavior on the path of the equilibrium outcomes
that survive DI when disclosure is mandatory. Except for rare parameter
values, the outcome is unique.
I construct this equilibrium as I constructed the equilibria in Part III.
First, I find the offer that d-1 would make if it were common knowledge that
j=1. Next, I find d-h's best offer under the assumption that this offer signals
to P thatj=h and d-1 does not want to make d-h's offer. Except in one case,
d-1 should be indifferent between making his equilibrium offer and imitating
d-h. This is Case C, which I describe below.
There are four kinds of equilibria. If QL > c/(G+c) (that is, there is a high
probability that P is type L), then both types of defendant make offers that
only P-L might accept. P-L accepts d-l's offer, si, with 100 percent
probability but rejects d-h's offer, Sh, with positive probability in order to
prevent d-1 from imitating d-h. As in Part III, it is straightforward to verify
that, provided d-l is indifferent between offering s, and Sh, any offer sE(sJ, s1)
benefits d-l more than d-h. Therefore, P interprets this type of demand as
signalling that i-L and rejects it. In Case B, d-1 prefers to give in to both
types of plaintiff, but d-h makes a strong demand (low offer) that P-H
rejects with 100 percent probability. However, d-1 would prefer to make the
offer Sh if P-L always accepted it. Therefore, P-L rejects Sh with positive
probability and d-1 is indifferent between offers s, and Sh. Case C is
qualitatively similar to Case B. The only difference is that in Case C, d-l
strictly prefers offerings, to sh even if P-L always accepts Sh. Thus, d-1 is not
indifferent to d-h's offer. As a consequence, d-1 can make an offer slightly
greater than Sh, and P-L will accept it with 100 percent probability. This does
not disrupt the equilibrium because such an offer is less attractive to d-l than
sh, which in turn is more attractive than s,. In Case D, both types of defendant
make offers that appeal to P-H. P-H rejects d-h's offer with positive
probability in order to prevent d-1 from copying d-h and thus support the
equilibrium.
There is one feature of these equilibria that does not appear clearly in the
one-stage equilibria. I must specify how d responds when P rejects his offer
[Vol. 52: No. I
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES
(Two-STAGE MANDATORY DISCLOSURE MODEL)
P's probability
(,j) d's Offer of acceptance
CASE A (L,l) t
(L,h) i-G c+ G
C
Qc C (HI) 1 0c+G
(H,h) t-G 0
CASE B (LI) t+G
Qt.C (L,h) t-QG,(cc+2G Qt.(c G)
CQ. <= (HI) 1+G
(Hh) t-G 0
CASE C (L, 1) t1G 1
~ CC (L ,h) i GIQt L= (HI1) t G I
CQL (H,h) t-G 0= c+2G
CASED (L,I) t1G 1
Q= (H,1) t+G
G( H , h ) I1 , 1 c G
CASE
A
B
C
D
Ex Ante Disagreement Probabilities
Probability of Disclosure
qhQLG
c+G
2Q,.G-Qlc
qhQ/I+qhQJ, c+G
qhG
c+G
Expected Utility
P d
t -t
G
2
I-G -1+ c+G
G2
1+ -- -t-c-GK+G
GK
t- -1-c
K+G -i-c
t-G -t+ Q 2 +QC
2
_Q, C
Qt(c+G)
t-G -t-G
GK
t- K+C -t-c
t+G -t-G
t-G -t-!G
t-/G -t-G
GKI- --G -t-c
t-!G -t-G
t -
i+G -t-G
I -I-
Q;,(c+G)
Probability of Trial
Q11G
K+G
qh(2IG
K+G
qhQnfG
K+G
0
and counters with an unexpected demand. Equilibrium strategies have the
property that demands slightly below P-H's demand are more likely to
benefit P-L than P-H. Thus, d rejects them. In addition, in order to
prevent P-L from rejecting d's offer every time, it is necessary for d to reject
P-H's counter demand with positive probability.
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Perhaps the role of discovery and trial are puzzling in this model. After all,
the defendants make separating offers (that convey information about their
types) in equilibrium. Thus, even before d reveals his private information, P
can infer d's type. Similarly, after P makes her demand, the types of both
litigants are common knowledge. If incomplete information is really the
cause of bargaining impasses, but all the incomplete information disappears
before impasses arise, why cannot we avoid costly discovery processes and
trials? The answer is that it is precisely these costly procedures that make
separating equilibria possible (that is, the threat of costly procedures makes it
worthwhile to make serious offers that convey information to the other
player). If P-L could imitate P-H without the risk of going to trial, she
would do so. If P always accepted an offer that ought to come from d-h in
equilibrium, it would pay for d-1 to make that offer as well. While this insight
is not new and is indeed basic to all models with costly signaling, it is crucial
to note that settlements occur only because of the presence of bargaining
costs that litigants pay with positive probability in equilibrium. This point
reappears in the discussion of the game in which no discovery takes place.
I have not explained why there are no equilibria satisfying D1 besides the
outcomes presented in Table 2. The argument parallels the discussion in Part
III. I summarize it briefly. Smaller offers typically signal that the defendant is
type h. Hence, if d-h makes an offers * in equilibrium (which is accepted with
a positive probability), then he can convince P thatj=h by offering less than
s*. This means that in equilibrium, d-h offers the amount that makes either
P-L or P-H willing either to accept or reject given thatj=h. Thus, d-h
makes one of two offers in equilibrium. How often P accepts the offer
depends on d-1. Specifically, if P-i is indifferent between accepting or
rejecting d-h's offer, and P-i actually rejects d-h's offer with positive
probability (to prevent d-1 from copying d-h), then P must believe a slightly
higher offer signals that j= with positive probability. Hence, if P-i does
reject sh, then d-1 must be indifferent between offering s, and sh. These
arguments rule out outcomes that differ from those described in Table 2.
B. No Disclosure
When there is no discovery, neither litigant need pay if P refuses to accept
d's offer. For this reason, d will not make a serious offer in any D1 outcome.
There do exist sequential equilibria to the two-period, no-disclosure game in
which d makes a single offer (independent of j) and P always accepts.
However, these equilibria are equivalent to pooling equilibria in a one-period
model in which P makes a demand that does not depend on i, and d accepts
with 100 percent probability. This kind of equilibrium fails to satisfy DI since
a slightly lower offer by d would benefit d-h more than d-1 and would
separate the two types; therefore, these offers would be accepted with 100
percent probability (since P assumes the defendant has a strong case) in any
equilibrium that survives criterion Dl.
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The only DI-equilibrium outcome under no disclosure in which P accepts
an offer with positive probability occurs when d-h and P-L agree to the
same settlement that they agree to in the one-period, no-disclosure model.
However, in this case, equilibrium outcomes are identical to those of Part III.
Therefore, Table 1, Cases A-D describe the outcomes to the two-period, no-
disclosure game.
Plainly, the conclusion that allowing d to make an offer does not change
the equilibrium depends critically on the assumption that P can respond
instantaneously (without cost) to any offer d makes. However, the crucial
assumption is that d cannot respond to P's demand. While qualitative
features of the equilibrium would change little if I imposed a small cost
associated with rejecting an offer, the equilibrium could change considerably
in a model in which the number of offers prior to trial is determined
endogenously.
C. Discussion
As in the one-period version of the model, one cannot rely on voluntary
disclosure to obtain relevant information if c > 0. This result follows because
disclosure is valuable only as a method of reducing the probability of trials.
However, since P makes the final offer prior to trial, she is able to extract all of
the gains from an out-of-court settlement and thus d has no incentive to
disclose. Consequently, even if P viewed d's failure to reveal that j=h as
proof thatj=/, d-h could simply reject P's settlement demand and do as well
as he could in the no-disclosure equilibrium. Hence, the defendant would not
pay to reveal his information to P. The extreme nature of this conclusion
depends on P's ability to make the final offer and thereby extract the gains
from discovery. However, it seems likely that the costs of disclosure exceed
the private benefits of disclosure in more general specifications of the
problem.
Grossman, Milgrom, and Milgrom and Roberts45 present models in which
privately informed agents can make vague claims about their information, but
cannot tell outright lies. They conclude that equilibrium behavior involves
the uninformed agent responding skeptically to an opponent's disclosure and
through this strategy, inferring all relevant information in equilibrium. My
result shows that the Grossman-Milgrom-Roberts conclusion depends
critically on the assumption that disclosure is costless. Since providing
verifiable information is certainly costly in adversarial settings, it is not
possible to rely on voluntary disclosure to reveal relevant information. 46 If
45. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality, 24 J.
L. ECON. 461, 469 (1981); Milgrom, Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications,
12 BELLJ. ECON. 380, 388 (1981); Milgrom & Roberts, Relying on the Information on Interested Parties, 17
RANDJ. ECON. 18, 19 (1986).
46. In a different context, Farrell shows that the Grossman-Milgrom-Roberts result is sensitive
to the assumption that disclosure costs are equal to zero. See Farrell, Voluntary Disclosure: Robustness of
the Unraveling Result and Comments on its Importance, in REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 91, 94 (R. Grieson
ed. 1985).
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disclosure costs are common knowledge, then a third-party can pay a litigant's
disclosure costs. However, in the typical case in which the disclosure costs are
not common knowledge, this type of subsidy simply exchanges one incentive
problem for another.
Shavel147 presents a model of the discovery process in which voluntary
disclosure could lead to outcomes that are different from both no disclosure
and full disclosure. In his model only the plaintiff has private information.
First, the plaintiff decides whether to (costlessly) reveal this information.
Second, the defendant makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer. Finally, the
dispute goes to trial if and only if the plaintiff rejects the offer. When
disclosure is voluntary, Shavell finds equilibria in which only the most injured
types of plaintiff reveal their information. Even though disclosure is free, it
cannot be relied upon to lead to full revelation of information in this model.
The Grossman-Milgrom-Roberts result holds because if agents with
different information all choose to reveal nothing, then it will be in the
interest of the "best" to disclose rather than be pooled.48 However, in the
model of Shavell, a defendant may make a settlement offer acceptable even to
the type of plaintiff that has the best information in a pool. Otherwise, the
plaintiff rejects the offer with positive probability and a costly trial follows.
In the model of this article, requiring mandatory discovery always reduces
the probability of a trial. A simple computation demonstrates this result. The
fraction QHG/(K+G) represents both the maximum probability of a rial
when disclosure is mandatory and the minimum probability of a trial when
there is no disclosure. Similar computations show that both types of
defendant prefer their expected payoff from the no-discovery equilibrium to
the full disclosure equilibrium. P prefers the discovery equilibrium to the no-
discovery equilibrium. These results are not surprising and do not appear to
be sensitive to special features of the model.
Another general comparative-statics result describes the effect that
changes in G,K, and c have on equilibrium. The cost that P pays if d rejects
her offer is K. As K increases, the no-discovery equilibrium moves from Case
A to B to C to D; P's settlement demand becomes successively weaker; she
will demand less since she loses more (high K) if the case goes to trial.
Increasing c induces d to make larger settlement offers in the same way.
Increasing G causes litigants to make stronger settlement offers and increases
the probability of trials. In this model, increasing the probability of trial turns
out also to increase the equilibrium expected court costs. This result need
not hold in general. 49 People often argue that liberal discovery rules
encourage frivolous suits. It is certainly possible for P to extract a large
settlement from d when disclosure costs are high. Indeed, if there is a positive
probability that P is truly injured, then an uninjured plaintiff can extract a
settlement from d if c is sufficiently large and disclosure is mandatory. This
47. Shavell, Sharing Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation, 20 RANDJ. ECON. 184, 185 (1989).
48. Grossman, supra note 45; Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 45, at 25.
49. See Samuelson, supra note 17.
[Vol. 52: No. I
ANALYSIS OF DISCOVERY RULES
result holds even if an injured plaintiff drops her suit prior to trial; for
sufficiently large c, d would try to settle prior to discovery and d might offer an
uninjured plaintiff an amount large enough to induce a truly injured plaintiff
to drop charges. 50 The analysis of Part IV demonstrates that this type of
action is not possible when discovery is not mandatory.
The model makes predictions about which types of disputes go to trial.
When disclosure is mandatory, P-L always settles prior to trial. Hence, the
plaintiffs that do not settle always have strong cases. Therefore, the disputes
that go to trial will be settled in favor of the plaintiff a disproportionate
fraction of the time. The extent of this bias depends upon parameter values;
d-l tends to settle disputes out of court as well. Further, the direction of the
bias depends upon two modeling assumptions. First, since discovery is one-
sided, the defendant cannot discover directly that the plaintiff's case is weak.
Second, the arbitrary restriction that the plaintiff makes the final settlement
offer influences the sample of disputes that are not settled. Consequently, I
make no claims about the relationship between the results of trials and the
underlying distribution type of disputes that are settled. Priest and Klein 5'
emphasize the importance of determining the relationship between judicial
decisions, which are observable, and settlement outcomes. They present a
model in which trial judgments will be for the plaintiff 50 percent of the time
independent of the rules for allocating costs. Their results indicate that
changing disclosure rules could influence the outcomes at trial.
VI
LIMITATIONS AND APOLOGIES
My analysis suffers from the simplicity of my model and the particular form
of the settlement game that I analyze. The remainder of this Part discusses
the limitations of my approach and potential improvements.
First, my model of the discovery process is too simple to incorporate
essential characteristics of information transmission prior to trial. Because of
the way I modeled information, the difficult issue of how much effort the
plaintiff should spend questioning the defendant does not arise. In my
model, discovery imposes no direct costs on the plaintiff and always allows P
to acquire complete information. A more realistic model would require the
plaintiff to grope about in an attempt to discover the issues about which the
defendant has valuable information and would model the way in which an
informed plaintiff prepares a response to potentially damaging information.
Second, in my paper discovery is a one-sided process. I made this
assumption in order to avoid complications. However, since there is two-
sided uncertainty in this model, it is natural to ask what would happen if the
plaintiff could also be forced to disclose information. The answer is sensitive
50. Rosenberg and Shavell present a model that demonstrates the possibility of frivolous suits.
See Rosenberg & Shavell, A Model of the Nuisance Suit, 5 Ir'L REV. L. EcoN. 3 (1985).
51. Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
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to the way I model the sequence of moves. However, potential litigants settle
all disputes in a model in which full disclosure is mandatory, players move
sequentially, and trial is costly. The discovery process reveals all information
that could lead to disagreement. This conclusion naturally does not hold if
disclosure is partial nor need it hold if the bargaining process involves
simultaneous moves and hence the possibility of coordination failures.
Third, a standard argument in favor of liberal discovery rules is that the
discovery process eliminates trial by surprise, whereby one party can gain an
unwarranted advantage at trial by presenting arguments that the other side
was unaware of and cannot respond to. Analysis of this effect is beyond the
scope of my model.
Fourth, liberal discovery rules are said to allow for fairer settlements. The
intuition behind the assertion that more information leads to better decisions
is straightforward, but not completely persuasive. First, the ability to impose
discovery costs on the defendant may cause d to settle prior to discovery.
There is no reason to believe that these settlements are fair. Second, the
decision-theoretic intuition that more information leads to better decisions
does not hold in strategic environments. Consequently, disclosure of
information may not improve the quality of settlements. My model has
nothing to say about this issue because I provide no measure of welfare. In
order to build a normative theory of the settlement and litigation process, a
model would necessarily regard a third party, identified perhaps as ajudge, as
a strategic player able to design rules in order to achieve an objective. At a
theoretical level, it is clear that the judge should be interested in both
reducing the costs of the litigation process and guaranteeing that the process
leads to fair outcomes. As a practical matter, it is more difficult to find an
objective function that adequately incorporates the trade-offs involved in
balancing these two goals. The absence of an adequate welfare measure puts
the theorist in a difficult position. It becomes easy to judge the judicial
process on quantities like the probability of settlement, which can be
increased simply by increasing court costs but which ignores the nature of
settlements made.
Fifth, disclosure of information may impose costs or benefits because third
parties obtain access to information disclosed during the settlement process.
Also, an extended discovery process may benefit one litigant by postponing
the date of settlement. I ignore these effects.
I have not presented any results about how rules that govern the allocation
of court costs affect settlements. It would be easy to reinterpret the model to
allow this type of analysis. However, I do not believe that this analysis would
be useful. In a model in which litigants alternate offers, the litigant who
makes the offer immediately prior to trial has the ability to demand that the
other litigant pay court costs as part of the settlement. Therefore, this type of
model predicts that settlement probabilities do not depend on the rule
governing the allocation of costs and only act as a transfer from one litigant to
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the other.52 Useful results might come from a model in which endogenous
variables determine the number of offers prior to trial. It may be possible to
build such a model if litigants discount future payments and the plaintiff has a
right to demand a trial at any stage of the pretrial bargaining process. It may
be rational for a plaintiff to demand a trial if the cost of waiting for an
appropriate settlement offer exceeds her court costs.
VII
CONCLUSION
The model of this article makes the point that bargaining costs, whether
they are delays, costs of trials, or costs of disclosing information, are essential
aspects of any litigation problem in which parties have access to private
information relevant to the dispute. Increasing court costs lowers the
plaintiff's demand (since the plaintiff essentially pays court costs if the case
goes to trial). An increasing gap between trial payoffs to seriously and mildly
injured plaintiffs leads to stronger offers by both the plaintiff and the
defendant, and increases the probability of a trial.
The article also applies techniques that select a unique equilibrium
outcome for a simple two-stage model of the litigation process. The analysis
demonstrates that if disclosure is costly, then the defendant will not
voluntarily disclose information; that mandatory discovery reduces the
probability of trials, benefits plaintiffs, and harms defendants. Under
mandatory disclosure, increasing disclosure costs induces the defendant to
make larger offers. The assertions about the effects of mandatory disclosure
are, for the most part, well known. Brazil describes these properties and
others. 53 The analysis also suggests that the litigation process typically
provides a biased sample of disputes for trial. The extent of bias is dependent
on the parameter values, the process of discovery, and who makes the final
offer.
52. See Reinganum & Wilde, supra note 3.
53. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposalfor Change, 31 VAND. L.
REv. 1295 (1978). Brazil provides an extensive critical review of the practical implications of
discovery rules. He describes the benefits of mandatory discovery under ideal circumstances: that it
leads to an increased chance of learning the truth about a dispute; that it limits the potential for trial
by surprise; that it could increase the probability of settlement of disputes; and that it could "shorten
and streamline" the judicial process. Id. at 1300-03. These effects appear clearly in the results of my
model. Brazil's review emphasizes that these effects are unlikely to take place in practice, where
there are no rewards to attorneys for conscientious adherence to discovery rules, id. at 1313, and
limited sanctions against those who fail to follow them, id. at 1340-43. The article also points out the
potential, which appears in my model, to use the discovery process to impose costs on adversaries.
Id. at 1319-22.
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APPENDIX
The appendix sketches a proof that explains why the outcome described in
Part III is the only one that satisfies the DI criterion. First, I describe the
criterion as it applies to the model in Part III.A.
Fix a sequential equilibrium in which u,* is P-i's equilibrium expected
utility. Let S be a demand that P does not make in equilibrium and let
Bi(S)=Ir: rS + (1-r)T(i,j) > u* .
I require that if
Bi(S)CB 1 _i(S) and Bi(S)#BI-(S), then k(iIS)=0. (D1)
D1 guarantees that if P-H would gain (relative to her expected utility ui*) by
demanding S whenever P-L would gain, then the defendant should interpret
this demand as a signal that i=H.
I now show that the sequential equilibrium described in Part III satisfies
DI and that it is (essentially) the unique equilibrium outcome that does so.
First, I show that the beliefs that support the equilibrium satisfy (D1). Since
there is a unique best response to a demand S i[t(L,j), t(H,j)] and this
response attracts neither type of plaintiff, it suffices to show that if S E (Q (L,j),
t (H,j) and d accepts S with probability r, then the set of r for which P-L
prefers S to the equilibrium demand strictly contains the set of r for which
P-H prefers S to the equilibrium demand. P-L weakly prefers to defect
from the equilibrium if and only if
rS + (I-r)T(L,j) >t(L,j) or r >r, = [T(L,j) - T(L,j)]/[S - T(L,j)]
and P-H weakly prefers to defect if and only if
rS + (1-r)T(H,j)>r*t(H,j) + (1-r*)T(H,j)
t(L,j) + (1-r*)(T(H,j) - T(L,j)) or
r ,>rh= [t (L,j) - T(L,j)-r*(T(H,j) - T(L,j))]/I[S- T(L,j) -(T(H,j) - T(L ,j))].
It is straightforward to check that rh > rl; thus, P-L prefers to defect
whenever P-H prefers to defect. It follows that the strategies and beliefs of
Proposition 1 constitute a DI equilibrium.
Two observations imply that there is no other outcome that survives D1.
(a) If P-H makes a demand S * < t (H,j) with positive probability
in a sequential equilibrium, then any demand S E(S *,t (H,j)) benefits
P-H more than P-L.
(b) For any sequential equilibrium in which P-L strictly prefers her
equilibrium payoff to the expected utility that she would receive from
a demand S * that P-H makes with positive probability there exists
an a > 0 such that any demand S E(S *-a, S*) benefits P-H more
than P-L.
These observations follow from simple algebra. Fact (a) states that an
unexpectedly high demand benefits P-H whenever it benefits P-L. The
restriction S * < I (H,j) is necessary because d rejects any demand that
exceeds t(H,j). Fact (b) states that P-H benefits more than P-L from a
demand slightly less than P-H's equilibrium demand provided that P-L's
equilibrium payoff dominates the payoff P-L would receive from imitating
P-H.
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Fact (a) implies that P-H must always demand t (H,j) if beliefs satisfy DI.
Otherwise, P-H could gain by making a larger demand, which by Fact (a) and
(DI) would be accepted with 100 percent probability. Fact (b) implies that
P-L must be indifferent between demanding t (H,j) and her equilibrium
demand. To see this, observe that d must reject I (H,j) with positive
probability, for if d always accepted t (H,j), then P-L would always demand
t (H,j), but in this case d's best response is to reject the demand. Conse-
quently, if P-L strictly prefers to make some demand other than t (H,j),
P-H could demand slightly less than t (H,J), thereby signaling her type to d.
Therefore, d would accept this demand with 100 percent probability. Hence,
in any outcome that survives DI, P-H demands t(H,j), P-L makes some
other demand S, but P-L is indifferent between S and t (H,j). Since S reveals
to d that i=L, it must be that S=t(L,j). Since t(L,j) > T(L,j) and d rejects
t (H,j) with 100 percent probability if P- L makes this demand with positive
probability, it must be that P-L demands t (L,j) with 100 percent probability.

